ALBATS: Did you expect Yeltsin’s early resignation?
CHUBAIS: The idea as such was known and discussed. However, when I weighed the pro and cons, I thought there were more reasons to believe he would not resign that soon.
I was not sure that Yeltsin himself was ready for such a decision.
No. Even though it is clear that his health is not great, the roots of the decision are different. It’s important to note that once again many of us underestimated the scale of his personality. As I have said before, he is a unique man, one of the few capable of changing history. Yeltsin has always paid attention to symbolic things… a new epoch demands new people, a new generation.
Me, I don’t think so. However, it is clear that liberal politicians, those on the right of the Russian political spectrum, inevitably will and should take over.
Now? Yes. If the elections had occurred as scheduled, in June, the situation might be very different. I think it is clear that [Communist Party leader Gennady] Zyuganov and the communists are history. However, there is another threat on the left–represented by [former prime minister Yevgeny] Primakov and [Moscow Mayor Yuri] Luzhkov. They represent the idea of nomenklatura, or bureaucratic capitalism. The forces that back them have real and vast interests to defend, and they won’t give up easily. In fact, the main political cleavages that Russia faces in the next four–if not eight–years are no longer between capitalism and communism, they are between two types of capitalism. One is liberal capitalism based on the rule of law and a strong state that ensures and reinforces the law. The other is the bureaucratic, crony capitalism that exists now.
I think you overplay the oligarch’s power. There was a danger of their excessive influence over government back in 1997, but the 1998 financial crisis significantly undermined their power. The main danger today is different. First, it is criminals and their connections to elected or appointed officials. Second, the total corruption of government institutions from bottom to top, as well as corruption of all other branches–legislature and the courts. The new president will have to fight those dangers as well as many others; Putin has no choice but to be a reformer, whether some like this word or not. He has a unique chance. He has majority [support in the] Duma. Should he be elected president–and I have no doubt about that–he will have wide popular support and he will have a government and presidential administration accountable to him. I also have no doubt that the oligarchs will be loyal to him. Overall, he will have a very favorable environment to fulfill his ideas and plans.
He will rely on those who are capable of working effectively. The ideology of those people will matter little. It won’t be only liberals who join his government. However, I believe that, when it comes to selecting not only executives but also those who will be making political decisions, Putin will choose democrats and liberals, rather than those from the left. Second, I have no doubt that Putin will take steps to make the state much tougher than it is now. By a strong state, I mean a consolidation of power, firm and persistent efforts in reinforcing government decisions. However, I see the dangers… keeping our history in mind, the danger that the executive branch may cross the line and try to exercise its power in civic society.
There are no guarantees–except that that Russia has been living under democracy for the last 10 years. Putin and I share the same understanding of the role of the state, including its role in the economy, about the necessity for Russia to be an open society as opposed to the isolated one, about the place of Russia in Europe and the world in general. We talked a lot about those issues.
