And after? The incentive to push through reforms diminishes. A kind of reform fatigue sets in, and states have little appetite for further confrontation. In Poland, the Czech Republic and elsewhere, voters punished the government coalitions that pushed through the changes by voting them out of office. “Everyone wanted to be in the EU. They just didn’t want the reforms that went with it,” says Cas Mudde, a political scientist at the University of Antwerp in Belgium.
Some have even slid backward since accession. Until it was ousted last year, the Polish government threatened the independence of the civil service and the central bank by awarding top jobs only to government loyalists. Similarly, Slovakia, which had shown enormous promise by successfully pushing through a battery of economic reforms, is now ruled by a shaky coalition that includes hard-line nationalists, responsible for some bitter outbursts against the country’s Hungarian minority. Earlier this year the government drafted a law that would allow the Culture Ministry to fine the press for publishing information deemed to support behavior unacceptable to society. “This thoroughly contradicts basic democratic principles such as the separation of powers and freedom of speech for the media,” says Balint Molnar, deputy director of Freedom House Europe, a pro-democracy pressure group.
Indeed, countries throughout the region are struggling. The annual “democracy scores,” produced last year by Freedom House, measure performance in a range of categories including judicial independence and combating corruption, and found no evidence of improvement in eight of the 10 new member states in Eastern and Central Europe. And despite some impressive economic growth rates—Latvia last year topped 10 percent—some countries still shy away from tackling economic challenges. Only Slovenia has so far managed to meet all the tests needed to adopt the euro currency. Hungary has come under repeated pressure from Brussels to cut back a public sector that accounts for half the economy. Yes, France and Germany have also come under fire for their failures to cut their budget deficits, but a report last year from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development concluded that a lack of political consensus in Eastern and Central Europe “has led to fragile governments that are less inclined to pursue difficult reforms.”
Two of the worst offenders: Romania and Bulgaria. The European Commission lambasted their governments last month for failing to tackle corruption, fight organized crime or introduce judicial reforms. Bulgaria has the EU’s worst record for mafia-related murders. Romania last year tied for 69th place, alongside Colombia and Ghana, in Transparency International’s ranking of the world’s cleanest nations.
Polling data suggest the poor performance of the newcomers helps explain a growing caution among EU residents over admitting still more members. But the Commission has little leverage once it admits a nation into the EU. With the carrot of membership gone, there are few sticks to force wayward nations to toe the line. In the cases of Bulgaria and Romania, the EU insisted on special clauses allowing for sanctions if they failed to mend their ways. But the worst penalty they are likely to face is the refusal of other EU states to recognize their court judgments—a sign of no confidence that might scare off foreign investors. Still, the EU’s critical sting can also carry weight. By some accounts, the weight of criticism from Brussels—and the international embarrassment—helped trigger the defeat of the incumbent Polish government in last year’s elections. And in Bulgaria last week, opposition parties flourished in Parliament the latest report from Brussels as a stick to beat the government into tougher action on corruption. Their efforts have had little effect so far, but if a place in the EU can’t ensure good government or responsible economic management, it can at least set a handy benchmark.
