NEWSWEEK: Can you tell us what you’re hearing about the situation in East Timor, and about Thailand’s role? PITSUWAN: I think everybody realized that it was going to be quite, quite tense, at least to begin with. We were ready to participate in peacekeeping on two conditions: consent of the Indonesian government, and a resolution of the U.N. Security Council. Expressions of willingness were given by Thailand, by the Philippines, by Malaysia, Singapore. We realized as neighbors that it would be helpful if we would come in and try to cover the charred edges of emotions, of suspicion, of hesitation on both sides.
Tell us about the controversy over Australia taking the lead role. The U.N. Security Council decided that the Australians were the most available, willing and best prepared. But Australia was showing tremendous anxiety. In a way, very honest. But in the perspective of our Indonesian friends, a bit too active. Too overt. It was said by [Indonesian president B. J.] Habibie that it would be better if this was done by “members of the family.”
Did your government agree? No. But we understand the tension. We understand that we could help reduce the level of tension, of hesitation. And I think we have.
Did you argue that a Thai general should lead? No, we didn’t. No country in ASEAN [the Association of Southeast Asian Nations] was quite as prepared, or as up to speed, as the Australians.
Does that set back hopes for stronger regional-security arrangements within ASEAN? We certainly look at Southeast Asia as an open space. Anyone can come in, so this does not contradict the concept of regional security. These past few years we have been involved in confidence-building, knowing each other’s intentions and plans. We are just going into the phase of what we call preventive diplomacy. That has to be defined and agreed upon, so that it will not get into sensitive areas or internal affairs. East Timor was a special case, because the U.N. was involved from the beginning in the referendum there.
How might the problems of Indonesia spill over to its neighbors? Indonesia is the largest country of the region. We have been very much affected by the atmosphere of uncertainty, the lack of confidence. Because people from outside perceive the area as being one rather than different countries. The economy certainly has been affected. The investment atmosphere has been affected. Investment already committed to projects in some of those economies has been withdrawn.
How serious is the economic fallout? The immediate impact has already been felt on all the currencies of the region. Not entirely because of the situation in East Timor, but partly. You can’t say really how much, because it’s also affected by your own stock market. It’s also affected by the situation in Japan.
Apart from regional instability, what are the key constraints on the Thai economy? What about Japan? For the last two decades, we have been an extension of the Japanese economy. And the American economy, the European economy. We were not consumers of our own products. We were not producers of our own finished products. We produced parts for something outside of our region. With the Japanese economy idle, you get into a difficult knot. They have tried, and lately, we have seen signs of support in the Japanese economy. We think we could hang on to their coattails, so we can be drawn again into a more dynamic situation.
How well did the Clinton administration handle the economic crisis? In the beginning, it was a bit slow. I think probably because of the lack of clear understanding of the level of debt. Once they caught the grasp of it, they reacted very, very quickly through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
Do IMF predictions of slower growth mean the so-called Asian Century is already over? Southeast Asia is still very strong. What you’re looking for now is more sustained growth. It’s not going to be doubling as before, but I don’t see the problem. If they call that bubble period of irrational exuberance the rise of the Asian miracle, maybe we don’t need it.